Ch. 1: Background - Community Right-to-Know
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986;
How methyl isocyanate, which was not on the various "lists," was a key driving force for the Right-to-Know law;
Agency and its employees have "public duty" to share information with the community;
Ch. 2: Beginning of the Cover-up in 2005
Agency's Division of Air Quality implements extraordinary communication lockdown;
Dupont's "scrubbers" for removing air pollution (permit issued by the Division of Air Quality) simply transfer the fluorocarbons (PFAS) from the air to the wastewater;
Dupont did not have advanced wastewater treatment system (typically, an activated carbon system) to remove the fluorocarbons (PFAS) from the wastewater before discharging the wastewater to the Cape Fear River.
Did Air Quality supervisors and managers fully inform Water Quality supervisors and managers about the problem?
Why was the Agency going to such great lengths to silence and remove the inspector who reported the problem?
Ch. 3: Evidence of ongoing Cover-up in 2012
Reasons why staff with the Agency's Division of Air Quality would be expected to have a better understanding of a complex chemical manufacturing site than staff with the Division of Water Quality;
Evidence that the Division of Air Quality passed a misleading narrative about Dupont Fayetteville Works to Water Quality staffers in Raleigh: Agency's 2012 Memo & Report
Ch. 4: Agency's Website and News Reports in 2018-2019
The key Division of Water Quality documents are presented on Agency website;
The key Division of Air Quality documents are not presented;
Misleading public narrative #1 that Division of Water Quality staffer was "at fault;" and
Misleading public narrative #2 that the Cape Fear River Drinking Water Crisis was due to the Agency not having adequate staff or funding.